GNU bug report logs - #54786
Installation tests are failing

Previous Next

Full log

Message #55 received at 54786 <at> debbugs.gnu.org (full text, mbox):

From: Ludovic Courtès <ludo <at> gnu.org>
To: Maxim Cournoyer <maxim.cournoyer <at> gmail.com>
Cc: othacehe <at> gnu.org, 54786 <at> debbugs.gnu.org
Subject: Re: bug#54786: Installation tests are failing
Date: Tue, 07 Jun 2022 16:00:54 +0200

Hi!

Maxim Cournoyer <maxim.cournoyer <at> gmail.com> skribis:

> Ludovic Courtès <ludo <at> gnu.org> writes:

[...]

>>> I reviewed how that works, and it'd be easy; I just didn't see the
>>> incentive yet (there's no composition needed for the service, and it'd
>>> make the definition slightly less readable).  If you tell me
>>> mark+forkexec-constructor/container is going the way of the Dodo though,
>>> that's a good enough incentive :-).
>
> That turns out to be bit problematic; dbus-daemon must not run in its
> own user namespace (CLONE_NEWUSER) as it wants to validate user/group
> IDs.  That's probably the reason it was working with
> 'make-forkexec-constructor/container', as this was dropping the user and
> net namespaces, contrary to least-authority, which uses them all.
>
> The problem then seems to be that since we need CAP_SYS_ADMIN when
> dropping the user namespace, as CLONE_NEWUSER is what gives us
> superpowers.  Per 'man user_namespaces':
>
>   The child process created by clone(2) with the CLONE_NEWUSER flag starts
>   out with a complete set of capabilities in the new user namespace.
>
> Which means that if we combine something like (untested):
>
> (make-forkexec-constructor
>   (least-authority
>     (list (file-append coreutils "/bin/true"))
>     (mappings (delq 'user %namespaces))
>   #:user  "nobody"
>   #:group "nobody"))
>
> the make-forkexec-constructor will switch to the non-privileged user
> before the clone call is made, and it will fail with EPERM.
>
> When using 'make-forkexec-constructor/container', the clone(2) call
> happens before switching user, thus as 'root' in Shepherd, which
> explains why it works.

Damnit, that’s right.  For example the result of:

   (lower-object (least-authority-wrapper (file-append coreutils "/bin/uname")
                                          #:namespaces (delq 'user %namespaces)))

won’t run as an unprivileged user:

--8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8---
$ $(guix build /gnu/store/hy8rd8p8pid67ac27dwm63svl5bqn0a1-pola-wrapper.drv)
substitute: updating substitutes from 'https://ci.guix.gnu.org'... 100.0%
substitute: updating substitutes from 'https://bordeaux.guix.gnu.org'... 100.0%
substitute: updating substitutes from 'https://guix.bordeaux.inria.fr'... 100.0%
The following derivations will be built:
  /gnu/store/hy8rd8p8pid67ac27dwm63svl5bqn0a1-pola-wrapper.drv
  /gnu/store/bd63i07rvvsw7xgsig0cbdsw7fpznd1k-references.drv
building /gnu/store/bd63i07rvvsw7xgsig0cbdsw7fpznd1k-references.drv...
successfully built /gnu/store/bd63i07rvvsw7xgsig0cbdsw7fpznd1k-references.drv
building /gnu/store/hy8rd8p8pid67ac27dwm63svl5bqn0a1-pola-wrapper.drv...
successfully built /gnu/store/hy8rd8p8pid67ac27dwm63svl5bqn0a1-pola-wrapper.drv
Backtrace:
           5 (primitive-load "/gnu/store/ifsh87aifh2k8pqzhkjxncq3vskpwx3l-pola-wrapper")
In ice-9/eval.scm:
   191:35  4 (_ #f)
In gnu/build/linux-container.scm:
    300:8  3 (call-with-temporary-directory #<procedure 7f9aa3a674b0 at gnu/build/linux-container.scm:396:3 (root)>)
   397:16  2 (_ "/tmp/guix-directory.K9gBNH")
    239:7  1 (run-container "/tmp/guix-directory.K9gBNH" (#<<file-system> device: "/gnu/store/jkjs0inmzhj4vsvclbf08nmh0shm7lrf-attr-2.5…> …) …)
In guix/build/syscalls.scm:
  1099:12  0 (_ 1845624849)

guix/build/syscalls.scm:1099:12: In procedure clone: 1845624849: Operation not permitted
--8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8---

> I'm not sure how it could be fixed; it seems the user changing business
> would need to be handled by the least-authority-wrapper code?  And the
> make-forkexec-constructor would probably need to detect that command is
> a pola wrapper and then avoid changing the user/group itself to not
> interfere.

I think we would add #:user and #:group to ‘least-authority-wrapper’ and
have it call setuid/setgid.  ‘make-forkexec-constructor’ doesn’t need to
be modified, but the user simply won’t pass #:user and #:group to it.

Thanks,
Ludo’.

Previous Next

GNU bug tracking system
Copyright (C) 1999 Darren O. Benham, 1997,2003 nCipher Corporation Ltd, 1994-97 Ian Jackson.