GNU bug report logs - #52555
[RFC PATCH 0/3] Decentralized substitute distribution with ERIS

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From: Maxime Devos <maximedevos <at> telenet.be>
To: pukkamustard <pukkamustard <at> posteo.net>, 52555 <at> debbugs.gnu.org
Cc: ~pukkamustard/eris <at> lists.sr.ht
Subject: [bug#52555] [RFC PATCH v2 0/5] Decentralized substitute distribution with ERIS
Date: Sat, 29 Jan 2022 22:52:49 +0100

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Hi,

Is it possible for the following situation to happen?
If so, why not?

  1. server A is authentic
  2. server M is malicious, it tries to trick the client into
     installing an incorrect substitute
  3. (key of) server A is authorised
  4. (key of) server M is _not_ authorised
  5. server A and M are both in substitute-urls
  6. server A only serves ‘classical’ substitutes, server B also serves
     via ERIS+ipfs
  7. Both A and M set the same FileHash, References, etc. in the
     narinfo
  8. However, M set an ERIS URN pointing to a backdoored substitute.
  9. The client trusts A, and A and B have the same FileHash etc.,
     so the client considers the narinfo of B to be authentic
     because it has the same FileHash.
 10. The client prefers ERIS above HTTP(S), so it downloads via M.
 11. The client now installed a backdoored substitute!

Greetings,
Maxime.

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