GNU bug report logs -
#47229
Local privilege escalation via guix-daemon and ‘--keep-failed’
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Reported by: Ludovic Courtès <ludo <at> gnu.org>
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 2021 11:18:02 UTC
Severity: serious
Tags: fixed, security
Done: Ludovic Courtès <ludo <at> gnu.org>
Bug is archived. No further changes may be made.
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On Thu, Mar 18, 2021 at 12:17:15PM +0100, Ludovic Courtès wrote:
> It does not affect multi-user setups where ‘guix-daemon’ runs on a
> separate machine and is accessed over the network, via
> ‘GUIX_DAEMON_SOCKET’, as is customary on cluster setups. Machines where
> the Linux “protected hardlink”[*] feature is enabled, which is common,
> are also unaffected—this is the case when the contents of
> /proc/sys/fs/protected_hardlinks are 1.
After publishing the advisory, we received a clarification about the
impact of "protected hardlinks".
When using a guix-daemon that does not include the fix [0] for the bug
reported here, it is still possible for rogue build scripts to escape
the build environment, even when protected hardlinks are enabled.
Protected hardlinks do make exploitation significantly more difficult,
but not impossible.
For this reason, we continue to recommend that all Guix users upgrade
their guix-daemons, as described in the original advisory.
[0]
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/guix.git/commit/?id=ec7fb669945bfb47c5e1fdf7de3a5d07f7002ccf
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This bug report was last modified 4 years and 125 days ago.
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