GNU bug report logs -
#44808
Default to allowing password authentication on leaves users vulnerable
Previous Next
Full log
Message #17 received at submit <at> debbugs.gnu.org (full text, mbox):
raingloom writes:
> On Mon, 23 Nov 2020 03:32:08 +0100
> Taylan Kammer <taylan.kammer <at> gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On 23.11.2020 00:20, Christopher Lemmer Webber wrote:
>> > Okay, I just realized I left a friend vulnerable by guiding them
>> > through a Guix graphical install and telling them it would give
>> > them a decent setup. They turned on openssh support.
>> >
>> > Then I realized their config had password-authentication? on.
>> >
>> > That's unacceptable. We need to change this default. This is
>> > known to leave users open to attack, and selecting a password
>> > secure enough against brute forcing is fairly difficult, much more
>> > difficult than only allowing entry by keys. Plus, few
>> > distributions do what we're doing anymore, precisely because of
>> > wanting to be secure by default.
>> >
>> > Yes, I know some people want password authentication on as part of a
>> > bootstrapping process. Fine... those users know to put it on.
>> > Let's not leave our users open to attack by default though.
>> >
>> > Happy to produce a patch and change the documentation, but I'd like
>> > to hear that we have consensus to make this change. But we should,
>> > because otherwise else I think we're going to hurt users.
>>
>> I think most ideal would be if the user is asked the following two
>> questions, with a short explanation of what each means:
>>
>> - Allow root login via SSH?
>>
>> - Allow password authentication in SSH?
>>
>> (I think Debian does this.)
>>
>> Because as you say, on one hand password authentication in SSH can be
>> a security risk. But on the other hand many machines never have
>> their SSH port exposed to the Internet, and the intranet is assumed
>> to be safe. In those cases it would be an annoyance to have to enable
>> it manually.
>>
>> Both points apply to direct root login as well I think.
>>
>> Allowing password authentication but disabling root login might also
>> be considered safe enough on machines exposed to the Internet,
>> because the attacker needs to guess the username as well. Only
>> presents a small increase in complexity for the attacker though.
>>
>>
>> - Taylan
>>
>>
>>
>
> Most people won't know why allowing password authentication is
> unsecure. Either it should be worded differently, have a warning, or
> not be an option.
>
> Same goes doubly so for allowing root login.
Agreed on both counts.
This bug report was last modified 4 years and 123 days ago.
Previous Next
GNU bug tracking system
Copyright (C) 1999 Darren O. Benham,
1997,2003 nCipher Corporation Ltd,
1994-97 Ian Jackson.