Subject: bug#43770: closed (Re: bug#43770: Geeks think securely: VM per Package (trustless state to devs and their apps))

From: [email-masked] (GNU bug Tracking System)
Date: Mon, 05 Oct 2020 14:02:02 +0000

Your bug report

#43770: Geeks think securely: VM per Package (trustless state to devs and their apps)

which was filed against the guix package, has been closed.

The explanation is attached below, along with your original report.
If you require more details, please reply to [email-masked].

-- 
43770: http://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi/bugreport.cgi?bug=43770
GNU Bug Tracking System
Contact [email-masked] with problems

Subject: Re: bug#43770: Geeks think securely: VM per Package (trustless state to devs and their apps)
From: Ludovic Courtès <[email-masked]>
To: bo0od <[email-masked]>
Cc: Ricardo Wurmus <[email-masked]>, [email-masked]
Date: Mon, 05 Oct 2020 16:00:55 +0200
List-Id: <debbugs-submit.debbugs.gnu.org>

Hi,

bo0od <[email-masked]> skribis:

> Actually what i wanted to say but seems i missed it, This security
> design can be engineered and implemented when Guixsd released based on 
> GNU-Hurd Kernel. Because its going to be totally new kernel and having
> this feature is without question the best security feature for the 
> future of security within operating systems.
>
> Otherwise we gonna fall into the same cycle of trust to outside
> package developers and their codes without preventive mechanism
> against if its malicious one.
>
> If you mean the bug report is not the place for this request, then i
> dont know where because i already discussed it in the IRC channel.(if 
> there is somewhere else i can report this just tell me)

It’s great to share your views of what you think should be done from a
security standpoint.  There’s little more we contributors can say other
than: yes, we agree, we’re working in this direction, and it’s going to
be a long journey.

What could help though is if people like you come and join us on that
journey.  I very much encourage you to play with Guix System and in
particular with the “childhurd” service that has recently landed and
should be of interest to you.

For now I’m closing the bug because as Ricardo wrote, it’s not a bug
report per se.

Thank you,
Ludo’.

Subject: Geeks think securely: VM per Package (trustless state to devs and their apps)
From: bo0od <[email-masked]>
To: [email-masked]
Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2020 18:01:18 +0000
List-Id: <debbugs-submit.debbugs.gnu.org>

Hi There,

If we look at current state of packages running inside GNU distros they 
are in very insecure shape which is either they are installed without 
sandboxing because the distro doesnt even provide that or no profiles 
exist for the sandboxing feature and has issues e.g:

- Sandboxing can be made through MAC (apparmor,selinux) or Using 
Namespaces (firejail,bubblewrap) But the problem with using these 
features it needs a defined/preconfigured profile for each package in 
order to use them thus making almost impossible case to be applied on 
every package in real bases. (unless a policy which saying no package is 
allowed without coming with its own MAC profile, but thats as well has 
another issue when using third party packages...)

- Containers are like OS, and to use it within another OS is like OS in 
OS i find it crazy and not just that the way that the package gets 
upgraded is not reliable to be secure so this wont solve our issue as well.

To solve this mess, is to use virtualization method and to make that 
happen is to put each package in a VM by itself means the package gonna 
use the system resources without being able maliciously gain 
anything.This provide less trust to developers and their code running 
within the system.

one of the greatest design made in our time towards security is 
GNU/Linux Qubes OS, it uses OS per VM and has VM to VM 
communication...etc i highly recommend reading their design to take some 
ideas from it:

https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/

Useful refer:

https://wiki.debian.org/UntrustedDebs
https://blog.invisiblethings.org/papers/2015/state_harmful.pdf

ThX!