GNU bug report logs -
#34632
[PATCH 0/2] Change from GSS to MIT-KRB5.
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Reported by: Marius Bakke <mbakke <at> fastmail.com>
Date: Sat, 23 Feb 2019 16:22:01 UTC
Severity: normal
Tags: patch
Done: Marius Bakke <mbakke <at> fastmail.com>
Bug is archived. No further changes may be made.
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Your message dated Tue, 14 May 2019 20:15:36 +0200
with message-id <87v9ycaomv.fsf <at> fastmail.com>
and subject line Re: [bug#34632] [PATCH 0/2] Change from GSS to MIT-KRB5.
has caused the debbugs.gnu.org bug report #34632,
regarding [PATCH 0/2] Change from GSS to MIT-KRB5.
to be marked as done.
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help-debbugs <at> gnu.org.)
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34632: http://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi/bugreport.cgi?bug=34632
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The GNU Generic Security Service and friends have been unmaintained for
many years now: <https://www.gnu.org/software/gss/>.
Since these libraries are security-critical, it would be good to switch
to maintained implementations. WDYT?
Marius Bakke (2):
gnu: gsasl: Use the MIT Kerberos implementation instead of GSS.
gnu: curl: Build against MIT Kerberos instead of GSS.
gnu/packages/curl.scm | 10 ++++++----
gnu/packages/gsasl.scm | 4 +++-
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--
2.20.1
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Hi Maxim,
Maxim Cournoyer <maxim.cournoyer <at> gmail.com> writes:
> Hello,
>
> Leo Famulari <leo <at> famulari.name> writes:
>
>> On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 11:43:26PM -0400, Maxim Cournoyer wrote:
>>> Unmaintained on what ground? The website doesn't list fresh news,
>>> but the latest release was made in 2014 [1], and the maintainer has made
>>> changes to the Debian package last time in 2017 [2]. I wouldn't say it's
>>> unmaintained until the maintainer says so or CVEs pile up unfixed (which
>>> there aren't).
>>
>> Considering the rate of vulnerability discovery in MIT Kerberos [0] I
>> think that, if GSS was being examined to the same degree, we would learn
>> of many serious bugs. Any significant C codebase of this age will have
>> such bugs. But unfortunately GSS hasn't received as much scrutiny.
>>
>> [0]
>> https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=krb5
>
> Just FYI,
>
> I had ping'd the GSS mailing list with this message:
> http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/help-gss/2019-03/msg00001.html, but
> there haven't been a reply (yet).
>
> So it looks like it was a wise decision to make the switch! Sorry for
> doubting, eh!
Thank you very much for checking with upstream :-)
I was on the fence about this switch myself, and submitted this patch
hoping for feedback along these lines.
It would be great to get Shishi and GSS into Googles OSS-Fuzz and
similar so that we can be more confident in the implementation.
For now I've pushed these patches in 996186b..828d376.
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