GNU bug report logs - #19479
Package manager vulnerable

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Message #14 received at 19479 <at> debbugs.gnu.org (full text, mbox):

From: Stefan Monnier <monnier <at> iro.umontreal.ca>
To: Kelly Dean <kelly <at> prtime.org>
Cc: 19479 <at> debbugs.gnu.org
Subject: Re: bug#19479: Package manager vulnerable
Date: Sun, 04 Jan 2015 21:16:00 -0500

> If filenames include version numbers and the version numbers are never
> reused,

The ELPA system in general does not enforce that.  But the GNU ELPA
scripts do, and other ELPA servers work in a way that should generally
make sure this is also the case.

> then your solution does prevent package replay attacks. Since Emacs
> packages already include a Version header (and the package name), you could
> actually do your proposed verification using that header, without changing
> the way signatures are currently made, which is a solution I addressed in my
> original emacs-devel message.

Indeed, I realized this just after I sent my message.
So we can fix this problem simply by changing package.el so as to check
that the name&version of the downloaded file match the name&version
contained therein.
Patch welcome.

> But remember, none of the above prevents metadata replay attacks. If the
> user himself is specifying the metadata (e.g. you manually request Emacs
> 24.4 because you know that's the latest version), then verification to
> prevent metadata replay attacks isn't the computer's job. But when the user
> just says to update some package(s) to the latest version, without
> specifying the version, then it is the computer's job. For this,
> put a timestamp of the archive-contents file into the file itself.

Agreed.  It should be fairly easy to add a timestamp in there without
causing any backward incompatibility.


        Stefan

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