GNU bug report logs - #18967
Tramp disables important SSH security features

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Package: emacs;

Reported by: Daniel Colascione <dancol <at> dancol.org>

Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2014 00:49:01 UTC

Severity: normal

Tags: security

Fixed in version 26.1

Done: Michael Albinus <michael.albinus <at> gmx.de>

Bug is archived. No further changes may be made.

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Message #13 received at 18967 <at> debbugs.gnu.org (full text, mbox):

From: Daniel Colascione <dancol <at> dancol.org>
To: Ted Zlatanov <tzz <at> lifelogs.com>
Cc: 18967 <at> debbugs.gnu.org
Subject: Re: bug#18967: Tramp disables important SSH security features
Date: Thu, 06 Nov 2014 16:58:24 +0000
[Message part 1 (text/plain, inline)]
On 11/06/2014 12:05 PM, Ted Zlatanov wrote:
> On Thu, 06 Nov 2014 00:47:40 +0000 Daniel Colascione <dancol <at> dancol.org> wrote: 
> 
> DC> Tramp disables SSH host key checks by setting
> DC> GlobalKnownHostsFile=/dev/null, UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null, and
> DC> StrictHostKeyChecking=no in its default method configuration. These
> DC> settings allow attackers to intercept connections to remote hosts, sniff
> DC> passwords, and cause other mischief. I don't think we should ship an
> DC> insecure configuration.
> 
> I think the alternatives are something like what Ansible does:
> http://www.ansible.com/blog/2014/01/15/ssh-connection-upgrades-coming-in-ansible-1-5
> or a SSH client library as a FFI. 

> SSH, when called externally, has many
> failure modes without those options.

So let it fail. Since when is it okay to trade diminished security for
improved reliability?

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This bug report was last modified 8 years and 211 days ago.

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