GNU bug report logs - #17625
details of package signing mechanism

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Package: emacs;

Reported by: Eric Abrahamsen <eric <at> ericabrahamsen.net>

Date: Thu, 29 May 2014 03:12:01 UTC

Severity: important

Tags: security

Found in version 24.4.50

Done: Stefan Monnier <monnier <at> iro.umontreal.ca>

Bug is archived. No further changes may be made.

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From: Ted Zlatanov <tzz <at> lifelogs.com>
To: Glenn Morris <rgm <at> gnu.org>
Cc: Eric Abrahamsen <eric <at> ericabrahamsen.net>, Stefan Monnier <monnier <at> iro.umontreal.ca>, 17625 <at> debbugs.gnu.org
Subject: bug#17625: 24.4.50; All installed packages marked "unsigned", no archive listed
Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2014 10:24:28 -0400
On Sat, 31 May 2014 17:28:16 -0400 Glenn Morris <rgm <at> gnu.org> wrote: 

GM> Stefan Monnier wrote:
>> I guess we could move the archive-generation process to another machine,

GM> I won't pretend to know what I'm talking about, but I think that's the
GM> kind of thing you have to do if this is to have any real value.

I suggested to Stefan and on emacs-devel that the signing process should
be manual and after review. That's how it works for Debian, for
instance. The concern from several people was that this would be hard on
the GNU ELPA maintainers. I think it's still worth doing, especially if
the task can be delegated and contributors are required to sign their
Git commits.

GM> And for an inherently-not-very-secure environment like Emacs, is it worth it?

I think so.  These packages can run arbitrary code and Emacs makes it
very easy to install them.

>> AFAIK we currently use http://elpa.gnu.org/packages/, so no SSL
>> involved.

GM> Right. Will it Just Work to change that to https?

>> I don't enough about SSL certs to be sure whether it would provide
>> comparable guarantees to signed packages.

GM> I think SSL would verify that you are talking to the server that you
GM> thought you were talking too, and that no-one had injected anything in
GM> between you and it. Which is all that gpg-signed packages would do, if
GM> the machine that hosts the packages also does the signing (AFAICS).

The file, the signature, and the GNU ELPA maintainers' public key have
to match; MITM attacks can't subvert that AFAIK.

Ted




This bug report was last modified 10 years and 236 days ago.

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